Whither Talks
The Statesman,12 May 2014
Given the distrust and complexities that exist at different levels, the new government will have to do a lot of tightrope walking while carrying forward the negotiations with NSCN and ULFA, says NIRENDRA DEV
Negotiations with armed militant groups that have long been waging war against established authority tend to be generally highly complex, with divergent interests coming into play. This is all too true for North-east India, where no strait-jacket formula can be applied as an ideal roadmap to resolve the insurgency problems of the region. These complexities increase manifold when there is a change of guard at the Centre.
The negotiations with the Naga militants began way back in 1997 when I K Gujral was the Prime Minister. But despite such a long span, the talks have not really made forward movement. Instead, they have floundered on the 'greater Nagaland' issue ~ the Naga demand for the unification of all contiguous Naga-inhabited areas, which is one of the NSCN(IM)’s core agendas ~ and the inability of the stakeholders to thread a way through the complexities of the competing aspirations of the various communities of the region.
The Manmohan Singh government has to bear its share of blame, as during the last 10 years, it could not make any significant progress. It has not helped that the Congress-led regime at the Centre has not been able to bring the Congress chief minister of Manipur ~ the state that would be most affected if 'greater Nagaland' ever became a reality ~ on the same page.
In 2010, the state's chief minister, O Ibobi Singh, put a spanner in the works when he opposed NSCN (IM) leader Thuingaleng Muivah's visit to his native village ~ something agreed in principle by the Union home ministry. Ibobi linked Muivah's proposed visit to the 'greater Nagaland' issue, and the state was in turmoil for weeks. Earlier, in 2001, the 'greater Nagaland' issue had plunged Manipur valley into flames when the then NDA regime had agreed to extend the provisions of ceasefire with NSCN(IM) into Manipur state as well. The incoming government will have its task cut out for it in trying to find a solution that is acceptable to all stakeholders to the greater Nagaland issue, which has adverse implications in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh as well. It will also have to work meaningfully with Muivah, the NSCN(IM)'s general secretary, whose writ runs in the organisation, rather than that of chairman Isak Chishi Swu. Muivah is a tough nut who has been adopting a mixed approach at the negotiating table with the Centre’s representatives. At times, he has threatened to call off the talks; at other times taken a soft line, saying he is willing to cooperate with the government despite its 'mistakes'.
Over the years, the Naga militancy has turned further complex, thanks to happenings like the expulsion of S S Khaplang from his own faction, the NSCN(K), with which the government also has a ceasefire but has not started formal talks yet.
The new government will also have to carry forward another crucial talks process - thge one with the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). The peace process in Assam, which began over one-and-a-half years ago, has its own set of complexities, one of them being the fact that an anti-talks group, led by the ULFA’s ‘commander-in-chief’, Paresh Barua, is still active, and has made clear its militant intentions.
The new regime in Delhi would also need to resolve with the pro-talks ULFA leadership what it is exactly that they have in mind as their end-goal for the negotiations. One of the ULFA leaders is on record as having told a former Home Ministry mandarin, "If you are talking about ULFA accepting Constitution of India, we do not rule it out. But if it is accepting the statute book as it is now then we have nothing to talk".
Nascent peace processes have also been started with Karbi armed groups in Assam and some Kuki groups in Manipur, who have signed cessation of operations agreements with the government. The new government would also need to take steps to bring the insurgent outfits of Manipur, particularly the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) ~ a formidable task, as these groups have for decades ruled out the possibility of talks with the Indian government.
Finally, one also needs to talk about restoring the confidence of the people in the government of India and its mechanism. Perhaps the foremost grievance of the inhabitants of the region is the issue of governance, or lack thereof. The imposition of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, which allows security forces to act with virtual impunity, in many states of the region remains another critical area that needs to be looked at closely. There is also no denying that vested interests ~ officials, politicians, businessmen and local collaborators ~ have been making optimum use of insurgency to fill in their pockets and use it as a spring board for their political ambitions. This chain ought to be broken.
The Author is a Special Representative with The Statesman in New Delhi and author of the book The Talking Guns: North East India.
